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Summary 
Currently, the U.S. government retains limited authority over the Internet’s domain name system, 
primarily through the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions contract between 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). By virtue of the IANA functions 
contract, the NTIA exerts a legacy authority and stewardship over ICANN, and arguably has 
more influence over ICANN and the domain name system (DNS) than other national 
governments. Currently the IANA functions contract with NTIA expires on September 30, 2016. 
However, NTIA has the flexibility to extend the contract for any period through September 2019. 
On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced the intention to transition its stewardship role and 
procedural authority over key Internet domain name functions to the global Internet 
multistakeholder community. To accomplish this transition, NTIA asked ICANN to convene 
interested global Internet stakeholders to develop a transition proposal. NTIA stated that it will 
not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an 
intergovernmental organization solution.  
For two years, Internet stakeholders have been engaged in a process to develop a transition 
proposal that will meet NTIA’s criteria. On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board formally accepted 
the multistakeholder community’s transition plan and transmitted that plan to NTIA for approval. 
NTIA’s goal is to complete its evaluation in 90 days.  
Since NTIA’s announcement of its intention to relinquish its authority over IANA, concerns have 
risen in Congress over the proposed transition. Critics worry that relinquishing U.S. authority 
over Internet domain names may offer opportunities for either hostile foreign governments or 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, to gain undue influence over the 
Internet. On the other hand, supporters argue that this transition completes the necessary 
evolution of Internet domain name governance towards the private sector, and will ultimately 
support and strengthen the multistakeholder model of Internet governance.  
Legislation has been introduced in the 113th and 114th Congresses which would prevent, delay, or 
impose conditions or additional scrutiny on the transition. In the 114th Congress, H.R. 805/S. 
1551 (the DOTCOM Act of 2015) would prohibit NTIA from relinquishing its authority until 30 
legislative days after NTIA submits a report to Congress in which it certifies that the transition 
proposal meets certain criteria. The DOTCOM Act was passed by the House, but has not been 
passed by the Senate. Meanwhile, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) 
prevents NTIA from relinquishing its contractual control over IANA in FY2016.  
The proposed transition could have a significant impact on the future of Internet governance. 
National governments are recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN and DNS policy decisions, 
especially in cases where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests related 
to issues such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, privacy, and Internet freedom. How ICANN 
and the Internet domain name system are ultimately governed may set an important precedent in 
future policy debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet should be 
governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play. 
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Background: The Domain Name System and the 
Role of the U.S. Government 
The Internet is often described as a “network of networks” because it is not a single physical 
entity, but hundreds of thousands of interconnected networks linking hundreds of millions of 
computers around the world. As such, the Internet is international, decentralized, and comprised 
of networks and infrastructure largely owned and operated by private sector entities.1  
Computers connected to the Internet are identified by a unique Internet Protocol (IP) number that 
designates their specific location, thereby making it possible to send and receive messages and to 
access information from computers anywhere on the Internet. Domain names were created to 
provide users with a simple location name, rather than requiring them to use a long list of 
numbers. The domain name system (DNS) is the distributed set of databases residing in 
computers around the world that contain the address numbers, mapped to corresponding domain 
names. Those computers, called root servers, must be coordinated to ensure connectivity across 
the Internet. 
The U.S. government has no statutory authority over the DNS. However, because the Internet 
evolved from a network infrastructure created by the Department of Defense, the U.S. 
government originally owned and operated (primarily through private contractors) many of the 
key components of the network architecture that enabled the domain name system to function.2 In 
1998, with the Internet expanding beyond the academic and governmental spheres, the U.S. 
government transitioned the management of the DNS to a newly created not-for-profit 
international organization based in California called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN).3 ICANN employed (and continues to employ) a multistakeholder system 
of governance whereby policy decisions are made by a Board of Directors with input from the 
various stakeholder groups that comprise the Internet and the domain name system. These 
stakeholders include owners and operators of servers and networks around the world, domain 
name registrars and registries, regional IP address allocation organizations, standards 
organizations, Internet service providers, local and national governments, noncommercial 
stakeholders, business users, intellectual property interests, and others.  
After the 1998 transition, the U.S. government, through the Department of Commerce’s National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration or NTIA, retained a degree of authority 
over ICANN’s management of the DNS and other unique Internet identifiers such as Internet 
address numbers and protocols. With respect to ICANN, the U.S. government first exercised its 
legacy authority through a Memorandum of Understanding (1998-2006), followed by a Joint 
Project Agreement (2006-2009). Currently, NTIA and ICANN are joint participants in an 
Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) agreement, in which both parties agree to scrutiny and 
                                                 
1 For more information on how the Internet is governed, see CRS Report R42351, Internet Governance and the Domain 
Name System: Issues for Congress, by Lennard G. Kruger. 
2 For a history of U.S. government involvement in the development of the Internet DNS, see ICANN Security and 
Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), Overview and History of the IANA Functions, August 15, 2014, pp. 6-10, 
available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-067-en.pdf. Also see Aaron Shull, Paul Twomey and 
Christopher S. Yoo, Global Commission on Internet Governance, Legal Mechanisms for Governing the Transition of 
Key Domain Name Functions to the Global Multi-stakeholder Community, November 2014, pp. 6-7, available at 
https://ourinternet-files.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/gcig_paper_no3.pdf. 
3 For more information on ICANN, see CRS Report 97-868, Internet Domain Names: Background and Policy Issues, 
by Lennard G. Kruger. 
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evaluation by review boards. The AoC is voluntary, and either ICANN or NTIA can withdraw 
from the agreement at any time.4  
Concurrently, a separate contract between the ICANN and NTIA—specifically referred to as the 
“IANA5 functions contract”—authorizes ICANN to manage the technical underpinnings of the 
domain name system (DNS). The IANA functions can be broadly grouped into three categories: 
1. Number resources—the coordination and allocation of the global pool of IP 
numbers; 
2. Protocol Assignments—the management of IP numbering systems in conjunction 
with Internet standards bodies; and 
3. Domain names—management of the DNS authoritative root zone file.6 
Additionally, and intertwined with the IANA functions contract, a cooperative agreement between 
NTIA and Verisign (the company that operates the .com and .net registries) authorizes Verisign to 
manage and maintain the official root zone file that is contained in the Internet’s root servers7 
which underlie the functioning of the DNS.8  
The IANA functions contract gives the U.S. government, through NTIA, the authority to approve 
various technical functions such as modifying the root zone file (which would include, for 
example, adding additional generic top level domains (gTLDs) to the root zone). In this narrow 
sense, NTIA’s role is strictly clerical and administrative.9 Policymaking—such as decisions to 
make changes in the root zone file—is made by ICANN through its internal policy development 
process. Although it has the authority to do so under the IANA functions contract, NTIA has 
never refused to approve any IANA related actions as directed by ICANN.  
However, the IANA functions contract, while primarily administrative in nature, carries broader 
significance because it has conferred upon the U.S. government a “stewardship” role over 
ICANN and the domain name system. This stewardship role does not mean that the NTIA 
controls ICANN or has the authority to approve or disapprove ICANN policy decisions. Rather, 
the U.S. government’s authority over the IANA functions has been viewed by the Internet 
community as a “backstop” that serves to reassure Internet users that the U.S. government is 
prepared and positioned to constitute a check on ICANN under extreme circumstances (such as, 
for example, fiscal insolvency, failure to meet operational obligations, or capture or undue 
influence by a single stakeholder or by outside interests). 
                                                 
4 The agreements between NTIA and ICANN are available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/docicann-agreements. 
5 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. See http://www.internetassignednumbersauthority.org/about. 
6 The authoritative root zone is a globally shared set of data that functions as a central and unified directory that ensures 
an Internet user will connect with the website that corresponds with the domain name that he or she types into their 
browser.  
7 According to the National Research Council, “The root zone file defines the DNS. For all practical purposes, a top 
level domain (and, therefore, all of its lower-level domains) is in the DNS if and only if it is listed in the root zone file. 
Therefore, presence in the root determines which DNS domains are available on the Internet.” See National Research 
Council, Committee on Internet Navigation and the Domain Name System, Technical Alternatives and Policy 
Implications, Signposts on Cyberspace: The Domain Name System and Internet Navigation, National Academy Press, 
Washington, DC, 2005, p. 97. 
8 On August 17, 2015, NTIA announced that Verisign and ICANN had developed a proposal for removing NTIA’s 
administrative role associated with root zone management as part of the IANA stewardship transition. See 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/root_zone_administrator_proposal-relatedtoiana_functionsste-final.pdf. 
9 An explanation of NTIA’s role in managing the authoritative root zone file is at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf. 
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Meanwhile, the U.S. government continues to participate in the ICANN policy development 
process through membership in the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), which provides 
advice to ICANN on issues of public policy, especially where there may be an interaction 
between ICANN’s activities or policies and national laws or international agreements.10 However, 
while all governments have access to membership in the GAC, the U.S. government arguably has 
had more influence over ICANN and the DNS than other governments by virtue of the IANA 
functions contract with ICANN.  
NTIA Intent to Transition Stewardship of the DNS 
On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and 
procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder 
community.11 NTIA’s stated intention was that it would let its IANA functions contract with 
ICANN expire on September 30, 2015, if a satisfactory transition could be achieved. With NTIA 
having the option of extending the contract for up to two two-year periods through September 30, 
2019, NTIA announced on August 17, 2015, that it will extend the IANA functions contract 
through September 30, 2016.  
As a first step, NTIA asked ICANN to convene interested global Internet stakeholders to develop 
a proposal to achieve the transition. Specifically, NTIA expects ICANN to work collaboratively 
with parties directly affected by the IANA contract, including the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Society (ISOC), the Regional Internet 
Registries (RIRs), top level domain name operators, Verisign, and other interested global 
stakeholders. In October 2013, many of these groups—specifically, the Internet technical 
organizations responsible for coordination of the Internet infrastructure—had called for 
“accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which 
all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing.”12  
NTIA has stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role 
with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution. In addition, NTIA told 
ICANN that the transition proposal must have broad community support and address the 
following four principles: 
 support and enhance the multistakeholder model; 
 maintain the security, stability, and resilience of the Internet DNS; 
 meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA 
services; and 
 maintain the openness of the Internet. 
                                                 
10 For more information on the GAC, see https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/
Governmental+Advisory+Committee. 
11 NTIA, Press Release, “NTIA Announced Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions,” March 14, 
2014, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-
name-functions. 
12 ICANN, “Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation,” October 7, 2013, available at 
https://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-07oct13-en.htm. 
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Multistakeholder Process to Develop a Transition 
Proposal 
ICANN convened a process through which the multistakeholder community attempted to come to 
consensus on a transition proposal. The process was divided into two separate but related parallel 
processes: (1) IANA Stewardship Transition and (2) Enhancing ICANN Accountability. Figure 1 
shows a schematic diagram of the two interlinked processes. NTIA has stated that it views these 
two processes as “directly linked” and that “both issues must be addressed before any transition 
takes place.”13 On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board formally accepted the IANA Stewardship 
Transition proposal14 and the Enhancing ICANN Accountability report.15 The Board formally 
transmitted the transition and accountability plans to NTIA for approval.  
IANA Stewardship Transition 
Based on feedback received from the Internet community at its March 2014 meeting in 
Singapore, ICANN put out for public input and comment a draft proposal of Principles, 
Mechanisms and Process to Develop a Proposal to Transition NTIA’s Stewardship of the IANA 
Functions.16 Under the draft proposal, a steering group was formed “to steward the process in an 
open, transparent, inclusive, and accountable manner.”17 The steering group was composed of 
representatives of each ICANN constituency and of parties directly affected by the transition of 
IANA functions (for example, Internet standards groups and Internet number resource 
organizations). 
On June 6, 2014, after receiving public comments on the steering group draft proposal, ICANN 
announced the formation of a Coordination Group which was responsible for preparing a 
transition proposal.18 The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) was 
composed of 30 individuals representing 13 Internet stakeholder communities.19 On August 27, 
2014, the ICG released its charter, which stated that its mission is “to coordinate the development 
of a proposal among the communities affected by the IANA functions.”20  
 
                                                 
13 Testimony of Lawrence Strickling, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, “Preserving the Multistakeholder Model of Internet Governance,” February 25, 2015, p. 11, available at 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3abbe751-4440-4c5f-83bd-382b38cbdc05. 
14 ICANN, Adopted Board Resolutions, “IANA Transition Stewardship Proposal from ICG,” March 10, 2016, available 
at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-stewardship-transition-proposal-resolutions-exceprts-10mar16-
en.pdf. 
15 ICANN, Adopted Board Resolutions, “Proposal from CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability,” March 10, 
2016, available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ccwg-accountability-proposal-resolutions-exceprts-
10mar16-en.pdf. 
16 Available at http://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/iana/transition/draft-proposal-08apr14-en.htm. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Details on the Coordination Group are available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-
06-06-en#/. 
19 Information on ICG membership is available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/icg-members-2014-07-29-en.  
20 Charter for the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group, August 27, 2014, available at 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/charter-icg-27aug14-en.pdf. 
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Figure 1. Schematic of Process to Develop IANA Transition Proposal  
 
Source: ICANN. 
Notes: ICG = IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group; CRISP = Consolidated Regional Internet 
Registries (RIR) IANA Stewardship Proposal Team; CWG = Cross Community Working Group on Naming 
Related Functions; CCWG = Accountability Cross Community Working Group; PEG = Public Experts Group. 
The ICG requested a proposal for each of the three primary IANA functions (domain name-
related functions, numbering, and protocol parameters) to be developed by the three operational 
communities associated with each of those primary functions. Upon receipt of the three 
proposals, the ICG worked to develop a single consolidated proposal. The three proposals break 
out as follows: 
 Number Resources—developed by the five Regional Internet Registries (RIR) 
via the Consolidated RIR IANA Stewardship Proposal Team (CRISP Team).  
 Protocol Parameters—developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
through the IANAPLAN Working Group (IANAPLAN WG).  
 Domain Names—developed by the Cross Community Working Group to 
Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related 
Functions (CWG-Stewardship). 
While the Number Resources and the Protocol Parameter proposals were completed in January 
2015, consensus on a domain name function proposal proved more difficult to reach, with the 
CWG-Stewardship group unable to meet an initial January 2015 deadline. This is perhaps due to 
the fact that both numbering and protocols are currently operated by external groups which 
already perform these activities under contract with ICANN. The domain name IANA function is 
performed by ICANN itself (under contract to NTIA), and the question of how to transition away 
from the NTIA contract with respect to the domain naming function is inherently more complex 
and controversial.  
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The CWG-Stewardship group was composed of 19 members appointed by chartering 
organizations and 115 participants who contributed to mailing list conversations and meetings. 
The key question the group grappled with was whether a new organization or entity should be 
created to oversee the IANA functions contract (an external model), or whether ICANN itself—
subject to enhanced accountability measures—should be given authority over the IANA function 
(an internal model).  
Proposal 
On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board approved the final IANA Transition Stewardship 
Proposal. The proposal combines the three proposals developed for Numbers Resources, Protocol 
Parameters, and Domain Names:  
 Numbers Resources—the numbers community proposed that ICANN continue to 
serve as the IANA Functions Operator and perform those services under a 
contract with the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). The numbers 
community also proposed a contractual Service Level Agreement between the 
RIRs and the IANA Numbering Service Operator and a Review Committee 
comprising community representatives from each region to advise the RIRs on 
the IANA functions operator’s performance and adherence to identified service 
levels. 
 Protocol Parameters—the protocol parameters community proposed to continue 
to rely on the current system of agreements, policies and oversight mechanisms 
created by the IETF, ICANN, and IAB for the provisions of the protocols 
parameters-related IANA functions. 
 Domain Names—the domain names community proposed to form a new, 
separate legal entity, Post-Transition IANA (PTI), as an affiliate (subsidiary) of 
ICANN that would become the IANA functions operator in contract with 
ICANN. This proposal integrates elements of both the internal and external 
models. ICANN would assume the role currently fulfilled by NTIA (overseeing 
the IANA function), while PTI would assume the role currently played by 
ICANN (the IANA functions operator).The legal jurisdiction in which ICANN 
resides (California) is to remain unchanged. The proposal includes the creation of 
a Customer Standing Committee (CSC) responsible for monitoring the operator’s 
performance according to the contractual requirements and service level 
expectations. The proposal establishes a multistakeholder IANA Function 
Review process (IFR) to conduct review of PTI. 
Enhancing ICANN Accountability 
In parallel with the IANA stewardship transition process, ICANN initiated a separate but related 
process on how to enhance ICANN’s accountability. The purpose of this process was to ensure 
that ICANN will remain accountable to Internet stakeholders if and when ICANN is no longer 
subject to the IANA contract with the U.S. government. Specifically, the process examined how 
ICANN’s broader accountability mechanisms should be strengthened to address the potential 
absence of its historical contractual relationship with the DOC, including looking at strengthening 
existing accountability mechanisms (e.g., the ICANN bylaws and the Affirmation of 
Commitments). 
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To implement the accountability process, ICANN formed a Cross Community Working Group 
(CCWG) to develop proposals to enhance ICANN’s accountability towards all stakeholders.21 
The CCWG pursued two interrelated Work Streams. Work Stream 1 focused on mechanisms 
enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of 
the IANA Stewardship Transition. Work Stream 2 focused on addressing accountability topics for 
which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA 
Stewardship Transition. 
Membership in the CCWG was open to individuals appointed by the various stakeholder 
organizations within the ICANN community, with decisions made by consensus. Additionally, the 
CCWG was open to any interested person as a participant. Participants were able to attend and 
participate in all meetings, but were not part of any consensus or decisionmaking process. 
Additionally, up to seven advisors, selected by a Public Experts Group,22 provided the CCWG 
with independent advice and research and identify best practices at an early stage of deliberation. 
Other members of the CCWG included an ICANN staff member, a past participant in the 
Accountability and Transparency Review Team(s), a liaison with the IANA Stewardship 
Transition Coordination Group (ICG), and an ICANN Board liaison. All of those individuals 
participated but were not part of the decisionmaking process.  
Proposal 
The CCWG-Accountability Work Stream 1 proposal was approved by the ICANN Board on 
March 10, 2016. The proposal seeks to enhance ICANN’s accountability by specifying powers 
for the ICANN community that can be enforced when consensus cannot be reached. Specifically, 
CCWG-Accountability proposed the creation of a new entity, referred to as the “Empowered 
Community,” that will act at the direction of the multistakeholder community as constituted by 
ICANN’s Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. Under California law, the new 
entity would take the form of a California unincorporated association and be given the role of 
Sole Designator of ICANN Board Directors. Triggered by a petitioning, consultation, and 
escalation process, the Empowered Community would have the power to:  
 Reject ICANN Budgets, IANA Budgets or Strategic/Operating Plans. 
 Reject changes to ICANN’s Standard Bylaws. 
 Approve changes to new Fundamental Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation and 
ICANN’s sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of ICANN’s assets. 
The threshold for Board approval for changing a Fundamental Bylaw is raised 
from two-thirds to three-fourths. 
 Remove an individual ICANN Board Director.  
 Recall the entire ICANN Board. 
 Initiate a binding Independent Review Process on behalf of the Community.  
 Reject ICANN Board decisions relating to reviews of the IANA functions, 
including the triggering of Post-Transition IANA separation. 
 Inspect ICANN’s books and records, and initiate investigatory audits. 
                                                 
21 The CCWG Charter uses the following definition of stakeholder: “a person, group or organization that has a direct or 
indirect stake or interest in the organization because it can either affect the organization or be affected by it.” See 
https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-11-05-en. 
22 https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-08-19-en. 
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Also proposed is a revised mission statement for the ICANN Bylaws that clarifies what ICANN 
does, while not changing ICANN’s historic mission; an enhanced and binding Independent 
Review Process (IRP) with a broader scope, reaffirming the IRP’s power to ensure ICANN stays 
within its mission; and enhancements to the Reconsideration Request process. Other 
recommendations include the insertion of a commitment to recognition of human rights, 
incorporating the reviews called for under the Affirmation of Commitments into the ICANN 
Bylaws, and modifying structural reviews to include considerations of supporting organizations’ 
and advisory committees’ accountability. 
Finally, the proposal addressed how ICANN should consider advice from the Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC). Under the proposal, GAC formal advice must be reached by full 
consensus,23 at which point the Board and GAC would try to find a mutually acceptable solution. 
If a mutual agreement cannot be reached, the Board can choose not to follow that advice by a 
vote of at least 60% of Board members. The CCWG-Accountability proposal also recommended 
new language in the Bylaws that would prohibit ICANN from taking any action, including 
actions advised by GAC, that is inconsistent with the ICANN Bylaws.  
Stress Tests 
A critical aspect of the CCWG-Accountability group proposal was designing “stress tests” for 
each solution or accountability measure that the two work streams developed. Stress tests are 
designed to measure the resistance of the accountability measures to various contingencies. The 
proposal identified 37 specific contingencies that have been consolidated into five categories of 
stress tests: 
 Financial crisis or insolvency: ICANN becomes fiscally insolvent, and lacks 
resources to adequately meet obligations; 
 Failure to meet operational expectations: ICANN fails to process change or 
delegation requests to the IANA Root Zones, or executes a change of delegation 
over objections of stakeholders; 
 Legal/legislative action: ICANN is the subject of litigation under existing or 
future policies, legislation, or regulation. ICANN attempts to delegate a new 
TLD or redelegate a non-compliant existing TLD; 
 Failure of accountability: Action by one or more Board members, the CEO, or 
staff is contrary to mission or bylaws. ICANN is captured by one stakeholder 
segment; and 
 Failure of accountability to external stakeholders: ICANN modifies its structure 
to avoid obligation to external stakeholders. ICANN delegates, subcontracts, or 
abdicates obligations to a third party. ICANN merges or is acquired by an 
unaccountable third party.24 
                                                 
23 A formal objection by any one nation in the GAC would block “full consensus.” Currently, GAC decisions are made 
by consensus, but the GAC could conceivably, in the future, change to a “majority rules” decisionmaking process. The 
accountability proposal would ensure that only a full consensus GAC decision would be considered by the ICANN 
Board. 
24 Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability),“Enhancing 
ICANN Accountability,” February 11, 2015, p. 8, available at http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-ccwg-
accountability/presentation-ccwg-accountability-11feb15-en. 
The Future of Internet Governance: Should the U.S. Relinquish Its Authority over ICANN 
 
Congressional Research Service 9 
According to the CCWG-Accountability charter, stress tests could include an analysis of potential 
weaknesses and risks; an analysis of existing remedies and their robustness; a definition of 
additional remedies or modification of existing remedies; and a description of how the proposed 
solutions would mitigate the risk of contingencies or protect the organization against such 
contingencies.25 
Ultimately, any proposed accountability enhancements will be tested against the following 
questions: 
 Do they make ICANN more susceptible to “capture” (or the assertion of undue 
influence) by one stakeholder or group of stakeholders? 
 Can any individual or group make use of the redress and review processes in a 
way that paralyzes the work of ICANN? 
 Does any group of stakeholders have the ability to modify its internal procedures 
in a way that shifts how it interacts among the rest of the stakeholders within 
ICANN?26 
Next Steps 
With the transition plan submitted to NTIA, language in the ICANN Bylaws must be formulated 
and modified to incorporate the proposed recommendations. Additionally, all proposed actions 
and recommended organizational structures must be implemented and tested.  
Role of NTIA 
NTIA must approve the multistakeholder community proposal in order for the transition to take 
place. ICANN submitted the transition proposal to NTIA on March 10, 2016. On March 11, NTIA 
stated that it “will now begin the process of reviewing the proposal, hopefully within 90 days, to 
determine whether it meets the criteria we outlined when we announced the transition.”27 NTIA 
plans to gather input from other federal agencies and to be guided by recommendations from the 
Government Accountability Office.28 Prior to completing its review, NTIA expects ICANN and 
the community to adopt all the necessary Bylaw changes to implement the transition proposals.  
Meanwhile, on August 17, 2015, NTIA announced its intention to extend the IANA function 
contract for one year, until September 30, 2016.29 NTIA stated that beyond 2016, they have the 
option of extending the contract for an additional period of up to three years, if needed.30 NTIA 
                                                 
25 Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) Charter, November 3, 2014, p. 4, available at 
https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Charter. 
26 ICANN, Response to Question for the Record submitted by Senator Klobuchar, Senate Commerce Committee 
Hearing, “Preserving the Multistakeholder Model of Internet Governance,” February 25, 2015, available at 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/chehade-to-klobuchar-06apr15-en.pdf. 
27 NTIA Administrator Lawrence E. Strickling, Blog, “Reviewing the IANA Transition Proposal,” March 11, 2016, 
available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/reviewing-iana-transition-proposal. 
28 Government Accountability Office, Internet Management: Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess Proposed 
Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions, GAO-15-642, August 2015, 60 p., available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672055.pdf. 
29 NTIA Administrator Lawrence E. Strickling, Blog, “An Update on the IANA Transition,” August 17, 2015, available 
at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/update-iana-transition.  
30 NTIA Administrator Lawrence E. Strickling, Blog, “An Update on the IANA Transition,” August 17, 2015, available 
at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/update-iana-transition. 
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also announced that in March 2015, it asked ICANN and Verisign to develop a transition plan for 
managing the root zone file after the IANA transition. Currently, NTIA has a cooperative 
agreement with Verisign which designates NTIA as the Root Zone Administrator. Under a 
proposal developed by ICANN and Verisign, the IANA Functions Operator (currently ICANN 
and to be determined under the IANA transition) will have administrative authority over 
Verisign’s operation of the root zone file.31 
Role of Congress in the IANA Transition 
Concerns have arisen in Congress over the proposed transition. Some Members have argued that 
the transition requires additional scrutiny by Congress, while others have questioned whether the 
transition should take place at all. While the U.S. government has no statutory authority over 
ICANN or the DNS, Congress does have legislative and budgetary authority over NTIA, which is 
seeking to relinquish its contractual authority over the IANA functions. As such, Congress is 
keenly monitoring the progress of the transition, primarily through congressional committees with 
jurisdiction over NTIA. These include the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the 
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. Additionally, the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees—which determine and control NTIA’s annual budget—could impact 
NTIA’s ability to relinquish its existing authority over the IANA functions. 
Legislative Activities in the 113th Congress 
On March 27, 2014, Representative Shimkus introduced H.R. 4342, the Domain Openness 
Through Continued Oversight Matters (DOTCOM) Act. H.R. 4342 would have prohibited the 
NTIA from relinquishing responsibility over the Internet domain name system until GAO submits 
to Congress a report on the role of the NTIA with respect to such system. The report would have 
included a discussion and analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the change and 
addressed the national security concerns raised by relinquishing U.S. oversight. It would also 
have required GAO to provide a definition of the term “multistakeholder model” as used by 
NTIA with respect to Internet policymaking and governance. H.R. 4342 was referred to the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee. On April 2, 2014, the Subcommittee on 
Communications and Technology held a hearing on the DOTCOM Act.32 H.R. 4342 was 
approved by the House Energy and Commerce Committee on May 8, 2014. Subsequently on June 
5, 2014, the House Energy and Commerce Committee requested that the GAO examine the 
Administration’s proposal to transition NTIA’s current authority over IANA to the 
multistakeholder Internet community.33 On August 15, 2015, GAO released a report finding that 
NTIA had not yet developed a formal framework for evaluating the transition plan. GAO 
recommended that NTIA review existing frameworks for evaluation to help evaluate and 
document whether and how the transition proposal meets NTIA’s core goals.34 
                                                 
31 Verisign/ICANN Proposal in Response to NTIA Request: Root Zone Administrator Proposal Related to the IANA 
Functions Stewardship Transition, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
root_zone_administrator_proposal-relatedtoiana_functionsste-final.pdf. 
32 Hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, 
“Ensuring the Security, Stability, Resilience, and Freedom of the Global Internet,” April 2, 2014, available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/ensuring-security-stability-resilience-and-freedom-global-internet. 
33 See http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/letters/20140605GAO.pdf. 
34 Government Accountability Office, Internet Management: Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess Proposed 
Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions, GAO-15-642, August 2015, 60 pages, available at 
(continued...) 
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On May 22, 2014, the text of the DOTCOM Act was offered by Representative Shimkus as an 
amendment to H.R. 4435, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015. During House 
consideration of H.R. 4435, the amendment was agreed to by a vote of 245-177. H.R. 4435 was 
passed by the House on May 22, 2014. The House Armed Services bill report accompanying H.R. 
4435 (H.Rept. 113-446) stated the committee’s belief that any new Internet governance structure 
should include protections for the Department of Defense-controlled .mil generic top level 
domain and its associated Internet protocol numbers. The committee also supported maintaining 
separation between the policymaking and technical operation of root-zone management functions. 
On June 2, 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 2410, its version of the 
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 1646 of S. 2410 (“Sense of Congress on the 
Future of the Internet and the .mil Top-Level Domain”) stated that it is the sense of Congress that 
the Secretary of Defense should  
advise the President to transfer the remaining role of the United States Government in the 
functions of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority to a global multi-stakeholder 
community only if the President is confident that the ‘.MIL’ top-level domain and the 
Internet Protocol address numbers used exclusively by the Department of Defense for 
national security will remain exclusively used by the Department of Defense. 
Section 1646 also directed DOD to take “all necessary steps to sustain the successful stewardship 
and good standing of the Internet root zone servers managed by components of the Department of 
Defense.” In the report accompanying S. 2410 (S.Rept. 113-176), the committee urged DOD to 
seek an agreement through the IANA transition process, or in parallel to it, between the 
United States and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the rest 
of the global Internet stakeholders that the .mil domain will continue to be afforded the 
same generic top level domain status after the transition that it has always enjoyed, on a 
par with all other country-specific domains. 
The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2015 was signed by the President on December 16, 2014 (P.L. 113-235). The enacted law 
does not contain the DOTCOM Act provision contained in the House-passed version. Section 
1639 of P.L. 113-235 (“Sense of Congress on the Future of the Internet and the .mil Top-Level 
Domain”) states it is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should support the 
IANA transfer 
only if assurances are provided for the protection of the current status of legacy top-level 
domain names and Internet Protocol address numbers, particularly those used by the 
Department of Defense and the components of the United States Government for national 
security purposes; mechanisms are institutionalized to uphold and protect consensus-
based decision making in the multi-stakeholder approach; and existing stress-testing 
scenarios of the accountability process of the multi-stakeholder model can be confidently 
shown to work transparently, securely, and efficiently to maintain a free, open, and 
resilient Internet. 
It is also the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should “take all necessary steps to 
sustain the successful stewardship and good standing of the Internet root zone servers managed 
by components of the Department of Defense, including active participation, review, and analysis 
for transition planning documents and accountability stress testing.” 
                                                                
(...continued) 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672055.pdf. 
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On May 8, 2014, the House Appropriations Committee approved H.R. 4660, the FY2015 
Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) Appropriations Act, which appropriates funds for DOC and 
NTIA. The bill report (H.Rept. 113-448) stated that in order that the transition is more fully 
considered by Congress, the committee’s recommendation for NTIA does not include any funds 
to carry out the transition and that the committee expects that NTIA will maintain the existing no-
cost contract with ICANN throughout FY2015. During House consideration of H.R. 4660, an 
amendment offered by Representative Duffy was adopted on May 30, 2014 (by recorded vote, 
229-178) which stated that (Section 562) “[n]one of the funds made available by this Act may be 
used to relinquish the responsibility of the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration with respect to Internet domain name system functions, including responsibility 
with respect to the authoritative root zone file and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
functions.” H.R. 4660 was subsequently passed by the House on May 30, 2014. 
On June 5, 2014, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2015 
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (S. 2437). In the bill report 
(S.Rept. 113-181) the committee directed NTIA to: 
 conduct a thorough review and analysis of any proposed transition of the IANA 
contract to ensure that ICANN has in place an NTIA-approved multistakeholder 
oversight plan that is insulated from foreign government and intergovernmental 
control; and 
 report quarterly to the committee on all aspects of the privatization process and 
inform the committee, as well as the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, not less than seven days in advance of any decision with respect 
to a successor contract.  
The committee also expressed its concern that NTIA has not been a strong enough advocate for 
U.S. businesses and consumers through its participation in ICANN’s Governmental Advisory 
Committee (GAC), and stated that it awaits “the past due report on NTIA’s plans for greater 
involvement in the GAC and the efforts it is undertaking to protect U.S. consumers, companies, 
and intellectual property.” 
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) was signed by 
the President on December 16, 2014. Section 540 provides that during FY2015, NTIA may not 
use any appropriated funds to relinquish its responsibility with respect to Internet domain name 
system functions, including its responsibility with respect to the authoritative root zone file and 
the IANA functions. The prohibition on funding for NTIA’s IANA transition activities expires on 
September 30, 2015. Additionally, the Explanatory Statement accompanying P.L. 113-235 
reiterates House and Senate language regarding ICANN and IANA matters and modifies the 
Senate language by directing NTIA “to inform appropriate Congressional committees not less 
than 45 days in advance of any such proposed successor contract or any other decision related to 
changing NTIA’s role with respect to ICANN or IANA activities.” The Explanatory Statement 
also directs NTIA to submit a report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations 
within 45 days of enactment of P.L. 113-235 regarding “any recourse that would be available to 
the United States if the decision is made to transition to a new contract and any subsequent 
decisions made following such transfer of Internet governance are deleterious to the United 
States.” 
Other legislation addressing the proposed transition included: 
 H.R. 4367 (Internet Stewardship Act of 2014, introduced by Representative Mike 
Kelly on April 2, 2014), which would have prohibited NTIA from relinquishing 
its DNS responsibilities unless permitted by statute;  
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 H.R. 4398 (Global Internet Freedom Act of 2014, introduced by Representative 
Duffy on April 4, 2014), which would have prohibited NTIA from relinquishing 
its authority over the IANA functions; and 
 H.R. 5737 (Defending Internet Freedom Act of 2014, introduced by 
Representative Mike Kelly on November 19, 2014), which would have 
prohibited NTIA from relinquishing its responsibilities over domain name 
functions unless it certifies that the transition proposal meets certain specified 
criteria. 
H.R. 4367, H.R. 4398, and H.R. 5737 were referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
None of those bills were enacted by the 113th Congress. Meanwhile, the House Judiciary 
Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, held a hearing on 
April 10, 2014, that examined the proposed transition.35 
Legislative Activities in the 114th Congress 
House Legislation 
The DOTCOM Act of the 113th Congress was reintroduced into the 114th Congress by 
Representative Shimkus as H.R. 805 on February 5, 2015. As introduced, the DOTCOM Act of 
2015 would have prohibited NTIA from relinquishing responsibility over the Internet domain 
name system until GAO submitted a report to Congress examining the implications of the 
proposed transfer. H.R. 805 would have directed GAO to issue the report no later than one year 
after NTIA received a transition proposal. On June 17, 2015, the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce approved an amended DOTCOM Act. The amended version of H.R. 805 reflected 
a bipartisan agreement and was approved unanimously by voice vote. On June 23, 2015, H.R. 805 
was passed by the House (378-25) under suspension of the rules. 
H.R. 805, as passed by the House, does not permit NTIA’s authority over the IANA function “to 
terminate, lapse, be cancelled, or otherwise cease to be in effect” until 30 legislative days after 
NTIA submits a report to Congress on the final IANA transition proposal. Specifically, the report 
must contain the final transition proposal and a certification by NTIA that the proposal: 
 supports and enhances the multistakeholder model of Internet governance; 
 maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet domain name 
system; 
 meets the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of IANA 
services; 
 maintains the openness of the Internet; and 
 does not replace the role of NTIA with a government-led or intergovernmental 
organization solution. 
H.R. 805 also requires NTIA to certify that the required changes to ICANN’s bylaws contained in 
the transition proposal have been adopted by ICANN. 
                                                 
35 House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing, 
“Should the Department of Commerce Relinquish Direct Oversight over ICANN?” April 10, 2014, testimony available 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ID=027833A0-0028-42E2-A14B-B9C8BA2576A6. 
The Future of Internet Governance: Should the U.S. Relinquish Its Authority over ICANN 
 
Congressional Research Service 14 
Meanwhile, on June 3, 2015, the House passed H.R. 2578, the FY2016 Commerce, Justice, 
Science (CJS) Appropriations Act, which appropriates funds for DOC and NTIA. Section 536 of 
H.R. 2578 states that “[n]one of the funds made available by this Act may be used to relinquish 
the responsibility of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration with 
respect to Internet domain name system functions, including responsibility with respect to the 
authoritative root zone file and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority functions.” 
Other House-introduced legislation that addresses the proposed IANA transition includes: 
 H.R. 355 (Global Internet Freedom Act of 2015, introduced by Representative 
Duffy on January 14, 2015), which would prohibit NTIA from relinquishing its 
authority over the IANA functions. 
 H.R. 2251 (Defending Internet Freedom Act of 2015, introduced by 
Representative Mike Kelly on May 15, 2015), which would prohibit NTIA from 
relinquishing its responsibilities over domain name functions and the IANA 
function unless it certifies that the transition proposal meets certain specified 
criteria.  
Senate Legislation 
S. 1551, the Senate companion version of the DOTCOM Act of 2015, was introduced on June 11, 
2015 by Senator Thune. The language of S. 1551 is virtually identical to H.R. 805 as approved by 
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. S. 1551 was referred to the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 
On June 16, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2016 
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. In the bill report (S.Rept. 
114-66) the committee directed NTIA to “continue quarterly reports to the committee on all 
aspects of the transition process, and further directs NTIA to inform the Committee and the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, not less than 45 days in advance of 
any decision with respect to a successor contract.” The committee also stated that it “continues to 
be concerned about this process and supports the continued stewardship role of the United States 
over the domain name system in order to ensure the security of the .gov and .mil domains and to 
protect the freedom of speech and expression internationally.” 
Also in the Senate, S.Res. 71—designating the week of February 8 through February 14, 2015, as 
“Internet Governance Awareness Week”—was introduced by Senator Hatch on February 5, 2015. 
S.Res. 71 seeks to increase public awareness regarding NTIA’s proposed transition, encourage 
public education about the importance of the transition process; and call the attention of the 
participants at the ICANN meeting in Singapore to the importance of designing accountability 
and governance reforms to best prepare ICANN for executing the responsibilities that it may 
receive under any transition of the stewardship of the IANA functions. S.Res. 71 was passed by 
the Senate on February 5, 2015.  
Enacted Legislation 
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) prevents NTIA from relinquishing its 
contractual control over IANA in FY2016. Section 539 of P.L. 114-113 states the following: 
(a) None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to relinquish the 
responsibility of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
during fiscal year 2016, with respect to Internet domain name system functions, including 
The Future of Internet Governance: Should the U.S. Relinquish Its Authority over ICANN 
 
Congressional Research Service 15 
responsibility with respect to the authoritative root zone file and the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority functions.  
(b) Not withstanding any other law, subsection (a) of this section shall not apply in fiscal 
year 2017. 
Congressional Hearings 
As part of its continuing oversight over NTIA and the domain name system, Congress has held 
hearings on the proposed IANA transition and on ICANN’s management of the domain name 
system: 
 On February 25, 2015, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation held a hearing entitled, “Preserving the Multistakeholder Model 
of Internet Governance.”36  
 On May 13, 2015, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, held a hearing entitled, 
“Stakeholder Perspectives on the IANA Transition.”37 
 On May 13, 2015, the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual, Property and the Internet, held a hearing entitled, 
“Stakeholder Perspectives on ICANN: The .Sucks Domain and Essential Steps to 
Guarantee Trust and Accountability in the Internet’s Operation.”38 
 On July 8, 2015, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee 
on Communications and Technology, held a hearing entitled, “Internet 
Governance Progress After ICANN 53.”39 
 On March 17, 2016, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, held a hearing entitled, 
“Privatizing the Internet Assigned Number Authority.”40 
Other Activities 
On September 22, 2015, the Chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
(Representatives Goodlatte and Senator Grassley), Senator Cruz, and Representative Issa sent a 
letter to GAO expressing concern that the IANA transition and the relinquishing of U.S. 
government control over the root zone file may constitute a transfer of government property that 
may only be authorized by an act of Congress.41 Specifically, the letter asked GAO to examine 
three questions: would the termination of NTIA’s contract with ICANN cause government 
property of any kind to be transferred to ICANN; is the root zone file or other related or similar 
materials or information U.S. government property; and if so, does NTIA have the authority to 
transfer the root zone file or other related materials or information to a non-federal entity? 
                                                 
36 Testimony available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings. 
37 Testimony available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/stakeholder-perspectives-iana-transition. 
38 Testimony available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ID=7E5AF16E-B1F8-45B8-803B-
9E389A9B745E. 
39 Testimony available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/internet-governance-progress-after-icann-53. 
40 Testimony available at https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings-and-votes/hearings/privatizing-internet-assigned-
number-authority. 
41 Available at http://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/
20150922%20Grassley%20Cruz%20Goodlatte%20Issa%20GAO%20Request%20ICANN.pdf. 
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On October 15, 2015, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, 
Innovation, and the Internet (Senator Thune and Senator Schatz) sent a letter42 to ICANN calling 
for robust accountability reforms which may lessen the Board’s power and authority if those 
reforms conform with the multistakeholder community’s accountability proposal. The Senators 
further stated that no arbitrary deadlines should be used as a way to deter the community from 
securing the reforms it must have to sufficiently replace the role currently played by NTIA. 
On February 4, 2016, Senators Cruz, Lee, and Lankford sent a letter43 to ICANN’s CEO Fadi 
Chehadé, questioning the propriety of his participation in the World Internet Conference 
organized by the Chinese government. On March 3, 2016, a subsequent letter44 was sent to the 
Chairman of the ICANN Board questioning various ICANN activities in relation to China.  
Key Issues for Congress 
If the transition occurs and NTIA relinquishes its authority over the IANA functions, the U.S. 
government, through NTIA, will continue to participate in ICANN through the Governmental 
Advisory Committee. However, in a post-transition environment, the U.S. government (both the 
executive branch and Congress) will arguably have less authority and influence over ICANN and 
the DNS than it currently has.  
Key issues for Congress are: should the NTIA relinquish its authority? If so, what organizational 
structures and safeguards should be in place within the multistakeholder transition plan to ensure 
that the domain name system remains stable, efficient, and free from the disproportionate 
influence of intergovernmental entities (such as the United Nations) as well as from other 
governments who may be hostile to U.S. interests? 
Should the NTIA Relinquish Its Authority?  
Supporters of the transition45 argue that by transferring its remaining authority over ICANN and 
the DNS to the global Internet community, the U.S. government will bolster its continuing 
support for the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, and that this will enable the 
United States to more effectively argue and work against proposals for intergovernmental control 
over the Internet. The argument follows that if NTIA does not relinquish authority over the IANA 
functions, the United States will continue to be in the paradoxical and problematic position of 
opposing moves in intergovernmental fora to increase the power of governments in governing the 
Internet, while at the same time maintaining its unilateral authority over the Internet DNS by 
virtue of the IANA contract. 
Supporters of the transition also point out that the U.S. government and Internet stakeholders 
have, from the inception of ICANN, envisioned that U.S. authority over IANA functions would 
be temporary, and that the DNS would eventually be completely privatized.46 According to NTIA, 
                                                 
42 Available at https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/10/16/thune-schatz-icann-oct15.pdf. 
43 Available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/cruz-et-al-to-chehade-04feb16-en.pdf. 
44 Available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/cruz-et-al-to-crocker-03mar16-en.pdf. 
45 ICANN, “Endorsements of the IANA Globalization Process,” March 18, 2014, available at https://www.icann.org/
en/about/agreements/iana/globalization-endorsements-18mar14-en.pdf. 
46 The Commerce Department’s June 10, 1998 Statement of Policy stated that the U.S. government “is committed to a 
transition that will allow the private sector to take leadership for DNS management.” Available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm. 
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this transition is now possible, given that “ICANN as an organization has matured and taken steps 
in recent years to improve its accountability and transparency and its technical competence.”47  
Those opposed, skeptical, or highly cautious about the transition48 point out that NTIA’s role has 
served as a necessary “backstop” to ICANN, which has given Internet stakeholders confidence 
that the integrity and stability of the DNS is being sufficiently overseen. Critics assert that in the 
wake of the Edward Snowden NSA revelations, foreign governments might gain more support 
internationally in their continuing attempts to exert intergovernmental control over the Internet, 
and that any added intergovernmental influence over the Internet and the DNS would be that 
much more detrimental to the interests of the United States if NTIA’s authority over ICANN and 
the DNS were to no longer exist.  
Another concern regards the development of the transition plan and a new international 
multistakeholder entity that would provide some level of stewardship over the DNS. Critics are 
concerned about the risks of foreign governments—particularly repressive regimes that favor 
censorship of the Internet—gaining influence over the DNS through the transition to a new 
Internet governance mechanism that no longer is subject to U.S. government oversight.  
Evaluating the Transition Plan  
NTIA is currently evaluating the transition plan to assess whether it meets the criteria NTIA set 
when it announced the beginning of the transition process in 2014. Specifically, NTIA will 
determine whether the transition plan supports and enhances the multistakeholder model of 
Internet governance, that it does not replace NTIA’s role with a government-led or 
intergovernmental solution, that it maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the domain 
name system, that it meets the needs and expectations of global customers and partners of IANA 
services, and that it maintains the openness of the Internet. 
In its evaluation, NTIA will gather input from other federal agencies and be guided by 
recommendations of the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO recommendations 
were provided in the August 2015 GAO report, Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess 
Proposed Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions. GAO identified two 
frameworks or methods of evaluation that NTIA could consider in its assessment of the transition 
plan. These are the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
Internal Control—Integrated Framework (COSO framework) and the International Organization 
for Standardization’s quality management principles (ISO quality management principles).49 
Meanwhile, regardless of whether the DOTCOM Act is enacted, Congress will be given time to 
assess NTIA’s evaluation of the transition plan and to evaluate the transition plan itself. A key 
issue for Congress will be whether—in the absence of NTIA’s stewardship role—the plan ensures 
ICANN’s accountability to the multistakeholder community, and whether the new organizational 
structures that are put in place ensure that ICANN and the domain name system cannot be unduly 
influenced by foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations such as the United 
Nations. Another issue is whether ICANN and the multistakeholder community will be able to 
                                                 
47 NTIA, Press Release, “NTIA Announced Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions,” March 14, 
2014 
48 See for example: Atkinson, Rob, “U.S. Giving Up Its Internet ‘Bodyguard’ Role,” March 17, 2014, available at 
http://www.ideaslaboratory.com/2014/03/17/u-s-giving-up-its-internet-bodyguard-role/; and Nagesh, Gauthem, Wall 
Street Journal, “U.S. Plan for Web Faces Credibility Issue,” March 18, 2014. 
49 Government Accountability Office, Internet Management: Structured Evaluation Could Help Assess Proposed 
Transition of Key Domain Name and Other Technical Functions, GAO-15-642, August 2015, pp. 41-46. 
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adequately assess, test, and implement the transition recommendations before NTIA’s contract 
with IANA is relinquished.50 
Concluding Observations 
The future of how ICANN and the DNS will be governed is highly relevant to the broader 
question of how the Internet should be governed. While it is true that ICANN’s jurisdiction is 
limited to the technical underpinnings of the Internet (unique Internet identifiers such as domain 
names and addresses), it is also true that ICANN policy decisions (such new gTLDs) can affect 
other areas of Internet policy such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, privacy, and Internet 
freedom.  
As the Internet expands and becomes more pervasive throughout the world in all aspects of 
modern society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more pressing, with national 
governments recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN policy decisions, especially in cases 
where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests. ICANN is viewed by many 
as a ground-breaking example of multistakeholder governance. While ICANN does not “control” 
the Internet, how it is ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy 
debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet might be governed, and 
what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play.  
                                                 
50 See Brett D. Schaefer and Paul Rosenzweig, The Heritage Foundation, “Privatizing the Internet Assigned Number 
Authority,” Statement for the Record for the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, March 17, 2016, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20160317/104682/
HHRG-114-IF16-20160317-SD003.pdf.  The authors recommend a two-year extension of the NTIA-IANA contract 
which would “allow ICANN to operate under the new structure for a period of time to verify that unforeseen 
complications and problems do not arise while retaining the ability to reassert the historical NTIA relationship if 
unforeseen complications arise.” 
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Appendix. Acronyms 
Table A-1. Selected Acronyms Used in This Report 
AoC 
Affirmation of 
Commitments 
CWG 
Cross Community 
Working Group on 
Naming Related 
Functions 
CCWG 
Accountability Cross 
Community Working 
Group 
DNS domain name system 
DOC 
Department of 
Commerce 
DOD 
Department of 
Defense 
GAC 
Governmental 
Advisory Committee 
GAO 
Government 
Accountability Office 
gTLD 
generic top level 
domain 
IAB 
Internet Architecture 
Board 
IANA 
Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority 
ICANN 
Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names 
and Numbers 
ICG 
IANA Stewardship 
Transition 
Coordination Group 
IETF 
Internet Engineering 
Task Force 
IP Internet protocol 
ISOC Internet Society 
NTIA 
National 
Telecommunications 
Information 
Administration 
PEG Public Experts Group 
PTI post-transition IANA 
RIRs 
Regional Internet 
Registries 
The Future of Internet Governance: Should the U.S. Relinquish Its Authority over ICANN 
 
Congressional Research Service 20 
 
 
Author Contact Information 
 
Lennard G. Kruger 
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy 
lkruger@crs.loc.gov, 7-7070 
  
 
